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ABSTRACT
SGT eXchange Protocol (SXP) is used to propagate Security Group Tag (SGT) information
across the network devices. SXP connections are point-to-point and uses TCP as the underlying
transport protocol with roles as Speaker, Listener or Both. There are techniques to provide message
authentication, key-exchange, and integrity to the SXP connections. But, if the Speaker or Listener
is compromised, i.e., it is no longer a trusted entity, which could create harm to the network by
allowing "malicious Speaker to send the wrong IP-to-SGT binding to the valid Listener" or "valid
Speaker to send the correct IP-to-SGT binding to the malicious Listener". Hence, SXP connection
endpoints i.e., Speaker and Listener need to know whether the peer device is trustworthy or not
before establishing connection. The techniques presented herein propose attestation method to
SXP protocol messages for providing Proof of Integrity of SXP connection between devices.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION
SGT eXchange Protocol (SXP) is used to propagate Security Group Tag (SGT) information
across the network devices. SGT provides software-defined segmentation and policy enforcement.
SXP is included in the Open Daylight SDN controller, which allows other vendors to integrate at
Controller level instead of network. With this background, SXP connections are point-to-point and
uses TCP as the underlying transport protocol with roles as Speaker (i.e., device that sends the IPto-SGT binding), Listener (i.e., device that receives the IP-to-SGT binding) or Both.
Currently SXP connection uses following methods for providing message authenticity and
integrity:
• Using MD5: It requires pre-configured key (password) on both sides of the point-to-point
link and uses TCP-MD5 option with MD5 Digest.
• Using TCP-AO: It requires pre-configured keychain on both sides of the point-to-point link
and uses TCP-AO option with HMAC.
There are techniques in which SXP can use Dot1x for authentication and key exchange. But,
if the Speaker or Listener is compromised, i.e., it is no longer a trusted entity, which could create
harm to the network by allowing "malicious Speaker to send the wrong IP-to-SGT binding to the
valid Listener" or "valid Speaker to send the correct IP-to-SGT binding to the malicious Listener".
Hence, SXP connection endpoints i.e., Speaker and Listener need to know whether the peer device
is trustworthy or not before establishing connection.
Currently SXP protocol does not include any capabilities to exchange trust information
between Speaker and Listener to prove the peer was not tampered. In other words, trustworthiness
of the Speaker and Listener must be verified before the connection is established. This includes an
integrity check for both, the software as well as hardware of the SXP protocol participants i.e.,
Speaker and Listener.
The techniques presented herein propose attestation method to SXP protocol messages for
providing Proof of Integrity of SXP connection between devices. SXP messages between the peers
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(i.e., Speaker and Listener) are extended with extensions that carry Proof of Integrity. TPM
functionality is used as root of trust and as Proof of Integrity of SXP connection. Both SXP end
points gather below integrity measurements from the peer device:
• Hardware
• Software - micro loader, BIOS, boot loader, kernel, operating system
• Runtime - application binaries, libraries, config/manifest files
These measurements are verified against the device fingerprint (e.g., imprinted in the device
identity certificate issued by the manufacturer - SUDI). The result of verification determines the
decision to allow SXP connection establishment between the peers.
This method adds attestation information to the SXP protocol as an extension that embeds:
• A hardware fingerprint (derived from SUDI or similar, stored securely in tamper proof chip
e.g., ACT2/TAM)
• Platform information such as PCR, counters, time-ticks etc.,
SXP provides "Other Optional Attributes TLV" in "OPEN", "OPEN_RESP", "UPDATE" and
other messages as defined in IETF. This proposed method adds attestation information as TLV in
these messages. The device who is participating in SXP connection will use this attestation
information to verify whether the peer device who sent the "OPEN", "OPEN RESP" or "UPDATE"
message is trustworthy or not.
Figure-1 define “Other Optional Attributes TLV” of SXP OPEN/OPEN_RESP message carrying
attestation information.

Figure-1
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The techniques presented herein define method to provide trustworthiness to SXP protocol
messages ("OPEN", "OPEN_RESP" etc.,) exchanged between devices of the peer-to-peer SXP
connection. Moreover, trust is required in SXP connection, which propagate an SGT information
across the network devices. Especially, with SXP standard being available in IETF, multiple
vendors would implement in their products, providing trust would be one of the major contributors
for adoption. Also, with SXP being included in the Open Daylight SDN controller, which allows
other vendors to integrate at Controller level instead of network, we need to establish trust among
devices of SXP connection. Additionally, with Open Source SXP implementation being available
via GitHub, which allows other vendors to use to implement in their own products, newer
developments especially related to security and trust, would likely to happen, they can use this
method to provide trustworthiness among peer-devices of SXP connection.
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